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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
The Girardi Keese Law Firm (“Girardi Keese”) represents thousands of 
individuals in their claims against GlaxoSmithKline, L.L.C., over the use of the drug 
Avandia. Nearly all of these claims were brought in California state court, but some 
claims wound up in the multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) coordinated for pretrial purposes 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In 2009, 
Girardi Keese signed an Attorney Participation Agreement with the Avandia MDL’s 
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee. In the Agreement, Girardi Keese agreed to pay seven 
percent of the recovery on its clients’ claims arising from the use of Avandia into a 
litigation expense fund in exchange for the use of the Steering Committee’s litigation 
work product. A few months later, the District Court issued a pretrial order establishing a 
fund to compensate the Steering Committee for common benefit work and incorporating 
a materially-identical form agreement. 
Girardi Keese subsequently settled all of its clients’ claims but has refused to pay 
seven percent of the settlement proceeds to the common benefit fund. The District Court 
ordered GlaxoSmithKline to hold back seven percent of the settlement proceeds for the 
common benefit fund. Girardi Keese challenges the District Court’s jurisdiction over the 
dispute and the final fee award. We will affirm. 
I. 
Avandia is the trade name of a prescription drug developed and marketed by 
GlaxoSmithKline to treat type-two diabetes. Thousands of individuals have sued 
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GlaxoSmithKline over allegations that Avandia increases the individuals’ risk of heart 
failure. For the cases that were filed in or removed to federal court, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
2007 for coordinated pretrial proceedings. The District Court then appointed a Plaintiffs’ 
Steering Committee to direct the proceedings. One of the members of the Steering 
Committee was an attorney at Girardi Keese. 
In early 2009, the Girardi Keese attorney on the Steering Committee left the firm. 
A few months later, on May 12, 2009, another Girardi Keese attorney, Keith Griffin, 
signed a contract titled, “Attorney Participation Agreement,” with the Steering 
Committee. The Agreement “incorporate[d] by reference any Order of the Court 
regarding assessments and incorporate[d] fully herein all defined terms from such 
Order(s).” App. at 205. The Agreement covered “each and every claim, case, or action 
arising from the use of Avandia in which [Girardi Keese] has a financial interest, whether 
the claim, case, or action is currently filed in state or federal court, or is unfiled, or is on a 
tolling agreement.” Id. For these covered cases, Girardi Keese agreed to contribute seven 
percent of the gross recovery to “the Plaintiff’s Litigation Expense Fund”—four percent 
to come from Girardi Keese’s attorneys’ fees and three percent to come from the clients’ 
share of the recovery. Id. In exchange for seven percent of the recovery, the Steering 
Committee promised to provide work product developed by the Steering Committee and 
to “cooperate with [Girardi Keese] to coordinate the MDL litigation and the state 
litigation for the benefit of the plaintiffs.” App. at 206. Additionally, the Agreement 
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authorized Girardi Keese to “apply to the Court for common benefit fees and 
reimbursement of expenses” if 1) the Steering Committee requested assistance; 2) Girardi 
Keese “expended time and efforts for the common benefit”; and 3) Girardi Keese 
submitted an application “in accordance with the Court’s orders, or in the absence of such 
orders, the procedures established by the [Steering Committee].” Id. 
Shortly thereafter, the Steering Committee moved for the creation of a common 
benefit fund to compensate attorneys for MDL administration and work product. On 
August 26, 2009, the District Court granted the motion and adopted a proposed order 
provided by the Steering Committee and GlaxoSmithKline as Pretrial Order 70. App. at 
179. Pretrial Order 70 assessed a seven percent contribution—four percent from 
attorneys’ fees and three percent from the clients’ share—to the common benefit fund for 
any claim covered by the order. Pretrial Order 70 applied to “[a]ll Avandia claims, 
regardless of whether those claims are subject to the jurisdiction of [the MDL], tolled, 
unfiled, or filed in another jurisdiction” if, among other things, the attorney “sign[ed] on 
to the Participation Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit 1.” App. at 184. The order also 
“incorporated herein [the] voluntary Attorney Participation Agreement.” App. at 183; see 
also App. at 194 (“The Participation Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and is 
incorporated by reference and has the same effect as if fully set forth in the body of this 
order.”). It set out a procedure by which attorneys who signed the Attorney Participation 
Agreement could request payment from the fund for work performed for the common 
benefit of plaintiffs and authorized by the Steering Committee. The Attorney 
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Participation Agreement attached to Pretrial Order 70 as Exhibit 1 was materially 
identical to the Attorney Participation Agreement Girardi Keese signed in May 2009.1 
Girardi Keese only represented clients before the MDL in about twenty-five cases. 
However, Girardi Keese represented clients with Avandia claims in thousands of cases in 
a consolidated California state-court proceeding. In addition to its own work product, 
Girardi Keese used MDL work product, in the form of expert reports, to oppose 
GlaxoSmithKline’s motions for summary judgment in the California proceedings and 
indicated to the state court that it would use a variety of MDL materials in a planned trial. 
Ultimately, Girardi Keese and GlaxoSmithKline settled all of the cases for which Girardi 
Keese served as counsel—whether in state court or before the MDL—in August 2012. 
However, when GlaxoSmithKline indicated that it would withhold seven percent of the 
settlement for each claim pursuant to the Attorney Participation Agreement, Girardi 
Keese contested the applicability of the assessment to the California state-court cases. 
On March 13, 2014, the Plaintiffs’ Advisory Committee, which replaced the 
Steering Committee,2 moved for an order to show cause requiring Girardi Keese to 
demonstrate why all of the claims for which it served as counsel were not subject to the 
                                              
1 Compare App. at 196-200 (Pretrial Order 70), with App. at 204-07 (Girardi 
Keese’s signed Agreement). Most of the (minor) differences appear to be in terminology: 
“Eligible Counsel” as opposed to “Common Benefit Attorneys”; “Covered Claims” as 
opposed to “Assessed Cases”; and “Avandia Common Benefit Fund” as opposed to 
“Plaintiff’s Litigation Expense Fund.” 
2 In 2012, the District Court declined to renew the Steering Committee. In its 
place, the District Court appointed a group of coordinating counsel and a fee and cost 
allocation committee that serves as the Plaintiffs’ Advisory Committee. 
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seven percent contribution to the common benefit fund described by the Attorney 
Participation Agreement. The District Court issued the order to show cause and held a 
hearing on March 26, 2014.  
After taking evidence and hearing argument at the hearing and receiving 
supplemental briefing, on May 12, 2014, the District Court held that all of the settled 
claims were subject to the seven percent assessment and ordered GlaxoSmithKline to 
hold back the seven percent assessment from any settlement payments. App. at 7-8. The 
court reasoned that Girardi Keese used MDL work product and that the Attorney 
Participation Agreement covered all claims for which Girardi Keese served as counsel at 
the time of resolution. App. at 5-7. Girardi Keese filed a timely appeal. 
II. 
We begin, as we must, with jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs’ Advisory Committee 
questions the existence of our appellate jurisdiction over the District Court’s order.  
Girardi Keese argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order GlaxoSmithKline 
to hold back the seven percent assessment. We address each jurisdictional issue in turn. 
A. 
Subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, we review final orders of the 
district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Plaintiffs’ Advisory Committee here suggests that 
the order Girardi Keese appeals is not final because it is similar to “an MDL interim fee 
award.” Appellees’ Br. at 1 (citing In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 
156 (3d Cir. 2005)). In that case, the district court was asked to make an award of 
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attorneys’ fees to the MDL’s coordinating counsel. The court found that it was premature 
to make a final award to counsel, but did award counsel $153 million and allowed 
counsel to make another request for a final award in the future. In re Diet Drugs, 401 
F.3d at 150-52. We held that such an award was not a final order under § 1291. This was 
because “the total fee award has [not] been firmly established”; rather, the District Court 
imposed “an interim award of attorneys’ fees . . . [, which] foresees further and additional 
action by the district court, thus continuing, but not concluding, the fee litigation.” Id. at 
156-57. We also determined that the interim fee award was not a “collateral order” that is 
appealable under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), 
because it was not conclusive or otherwise unreviewable. 401 F.3d at 159-60. Thus, we 
concluded we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. 
We have not addressed whether an appeal from a fee assessment is an appealable, 
final order. We agree that a fee assessment may be properly analogized to a fee award to 
determine whether the order is final, but we disagree with the Plaintiffs’ Advisory 
Committee that the situation in In re Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 143, is the most analogous 
situation to this case. 
Rather, we conclude that this case is more similar to the situation in a different 
Diet Drugs opinion: In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2009). In 
that case, we found that a final award of attorneys’ fees was an appealable, final order 
because “it bestowed a definitive award on Class Counsel.” Id. at 537 n.30. Our 
jurisprudence treats fee awards that have been “reduced . . . to a definite amount” as 
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appealable, final orders. United Auto. Workers Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep’t v. Metro Auto 
Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Here, the fee assessment has been reduced to a definite amount. The cases for 
which Girardi Keese serves as counsel have been settled. The District Court ruled which 
of those cases was subject to an assessment—all of them—and stated how much of each 
settlement must be contributed to the common benefit fund—seven percent. Accordingly, 
because Girardi Keese’s payment obligation has been reduced to a definite amount, we 
conclude that the District Court’s fee assessment is an appealable, final order, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
B. 
Now we turn to the jurisdiction of the District Court to enter the order. Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1407, district courts are empowered to conduct coordinated, consolidated 
pretrial proceedings in cases transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 
Section 1407, however, “does not expand the jurisdiction of the district court to which the 
cases are transferred.” In re Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Prods. Liab. Litig.-II, 953 
F.2d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1992). Thus, “a transferee court’s jurisdiction in multi-district 
litigation is limited to cases and controversies between persons who are properly parties 
to the cases transferred.” Id. at 165-66. Relying on cases like In re Showa Denko and In 
re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 764 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2014), Girardi Keese 
argues that by essentially ordering Girardi Keese to comply with the Attorney 
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Participation Agreement, the District Court improperly exercised jurisdiction over the 
California state-court cases even though they were not before the District Court. 
In In re Showa Denko, the Fourth Circuit found that an order requiring state-court 
plaintiffs to contribute a portion of any recovery in their cases to pay for the MDL 
coordinating counsel exceeded the district court’s jurisdiction because those plaintiffs 
“have not voluntarily entered the litigation before the district court nor have they been 
brought in by process.” 953 F.2d at 166. Similarly, in In re Genetically Modified Rice, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to order state-
court plaintiffs to contribute to a common benefit fund for MDL coordinating counsel 
because “the district court does not have the power to order parties in cases not before it 
to contribute to the Fund” and “equity is insufficient to overcome limitations on federal 
jurisdiction.” 764 F.3d at 874; see also Hartland v. Alaska Airlines, 544 F.2d 992, 1001 
(9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he District Court had not even a semblance of jurisdiction original, 
ancillary or pendent to order anything or anybody, and least of all to compel lawyers who 
were not parties to the action to pay $3,250 into a fund.”) 
We agree with Girardi Keese that had the District Court simply ordered the firm, 
as total strangers to the litigation, to contribute to the common benefit fund from the 
settlement of its clients’ state-court cases, it would have exceeded its jurisdiction. 
However, that is not what the District Court did here. The proper question we must ask is 
did the District Court properly exercise jurisdiction to enforce the contract Girardi Keese 
made with the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee. We conclude that it did. 
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A district court that supervises a multidistrict litigation “has—and is expected to 
exercise—the ability to craft a plaintiffs’ leadership organization to assist with case 
management.” In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 547. Included in that ability “is the power to 
fashion some way of compensating the attorneys who provide class-wide services.” Id. 
Here, the District Court issued an order—Pretrial Order 70—dictating how it would 
allow the leadership organization—the Steering Committee—to be compensated. One 
way was to assess a percentage of the recovery of the cases before the MDL. The District 
Court also permitted the Steering Committee to, essentially, trade work product for a 
share in the recovery in cases not before the MDL. The District Court identified a form 
agreement that the Steering Committee and interested counsel must use to participate in 
the common benefit scheme and “incorporated” the agreement into the order. App. at 
183. 
When a district court incorporates the terms of an agreement into a court order, “a 
breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). Because a district court has jurisdiction to 
determine whether one of its orders has been violated, it may adjudicate whether an 
agreement incorporated into a court order has been breached. Id. (describing this power 
as within the court’s “ancillary jurisdiction”). Thus, if the District Court incorporated 
Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation Agreement into Pretrial Order 70, it had 
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jurisdiction to determine whether Girardi Keese breached that agreement and, if so, to 
remedy that breach.3 
Although Girardi Keese signed its Attorney Participation Agreement before the 
District Court entered Pretrial Order 70 and it is not exactly identical to the form 
agreement appended to the order, we find that Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation 
Agreement was incorporated into Pretrial Order 70. We reach this conclusion for several 
reasons. 
First, Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation Agreement contemplates and expects 
that the District Court will enter an order concerning the agreement. In three places, the 
agreement refers to an “Order of the Court regarding assessments.” See App. at 205 
(stating that the agreement “incorporates by reference any Order of the Court regarding 
assessments” and that the assessment will satisfy Girardi Keese’s obligations under the 
contract “absent extraordinary circumstances recognized by MDL 1871 Court Order”) & 
206 (stating that counsel may receive a distribution from the fund “pursuant and subject 
to any Order of the Court regarding assessments or the Fund”). At the time Girardi Keese 
and the Steering Committee entered into the Attorney Participation Agreement, no such 
                                              
3 We need not be concerned that the District Court’s incorporation of the Attorney 
Participation Agreement impermissibly expanded its jurisdiction by unilaterally bringing 
non-parties before it because, as explained in greater detail below, the Attorney 
Participation Agreement clearly contemplated that it would be governed by future court 
order and Girardi Keese, having signed that agreement, cannot contend that it is not a 
party properly before the District Court. See D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 
F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that parties may consent to personal jurisdiction 
by contractual agreement). 
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order concerning assessments or a fund existed. Thus, the parties to the agreement 
contemplated that the District Court would enter an order on assessments and a fund, and 
that the order would govern the agreement. 
Second, the Attorney Participation Agreement created continuing obligations on 
both sides. Girardi Keese was obligated to pay the seven-percent assessment, and the 
Steering Committee made a continuing promise:  
As the litigation progresses and Common Benefit Work Product 
continues to be generated, the [Steering Committee] will provide 
[Girardi Keese] with such work product and will otherwise 
cooperate with [Girardi Keese] to coordinate the MDL litigation and 
the state litigation for the benefit of the plaintiffs. 
 
App. at 206. Thus, at the time the District Court issued Pretrial Order 70, performance on 
both sides of the agreement was still in progress and could be supervised by court order. 
Finally, the terms of Pretrial Order 70 indicate that the District Court not only 
incorporated into the order all agreements using the appended form order but also the 
agreements made that used the same terms. Pretrial Order 70 states,  
Participating Counsel are entitled to receive the MDL common 
benefit work product and the state court work product of those 
attorneys who have also signed the Participation Agreement and 
shall be entitled to seek disbursements as Eligible Counsel pursuant 
to paragraph 5 of this Order. In return, Participating Counsel agree to 
pay the assessment amount provided in paragraph 4 of this Order on 
all filed and unfiled cases or claims in state or federal court in which 
they share a fee interest. 
 
App. at 183. Thus, the important factor for whether an agreement is an Attorney 
Participation Agreement that was incorporated into the order is not whether counsel 
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signed the exact same form as appended to Pretrial Order 70. Rather, it is whether the 
agreement contains the same obligations as those imposed by the order. Any agreement 
between counsel and the Steering Committee that tracks the requirements of Pretrial 
Order 70 was incorporated into the order.4 
Pretrial Order 70 covered the same claims as those listed in Girardi Keese’s 
Attorney Participation Agreement. Compare App. at 184 (defining covered claims for 
Pretrial Order 70), with App. at 205 (defining “Assessed Cases” for Girardi Keese’s 
Attorney Participation Agreement). They assessed the same percentage and split of 
recovery from Avandia claims and directed GlaxoSmithKline to withhold the assessment 
before distribution. Compare App. at 185, with App. at 205. As noted above, for all 
intents and purposes, Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation Agreement contained all the 
requirements of Pretrial Order 70 and is materially identical to the appended form 
agreement.  
Therefore, because the parties understood that the Attorney Participation 
Agreement would be governed by Pretrial Order 70, they had a continuing relationship 
under the agreement that could be governed by court order when the District Court issued 
the order, and Pretrial Order 70 incorporated agreements that contained the same 
obligations as required by the order, we conclude that Pretrial Order 70 incorporated 
Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation Agreement. 
                                              
4 It is irrelevant that Girardi Keese’s Attorney Participation Agreement was signed 
before Pretrial Order 70 was issued. A court can incorporate an already-existing 
agreement into a court order.  
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This is not, as Girardi Keese argues, finding subject-matter jurisdiction by 
agreement of the parties. The agreement itself is not the source of the District Court’s 
authority. Rather, the District Court’s authority over this dispute arose from its 
responsibilities to appoint and supervise a coordinating committee of counsel. The 
agreement was simply incorporated into an order the District Court was empowered to 
issue. 
Because it was within the District Court’s power to issue an order governing how 
to compensate the Steering Committee for its work and because Girardi Keese’s Attorney 
Participation Agreement was incorporated into that order, the District Court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate whether Girardi Keese5 breached the Attorney Participation 
Agreement and thereby violated Pretrial Order 70.6 
III. 
Turning to the merits of this appeal, Girardi Keese’s sole argument is that the 
District Court should have granted Girardi Keese compensation for the common benefit 
work it performed. We review the District Court’s fee determination for abuse of 
discretion, “which can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper procedures in making 
                                              
5 Girardi Keese also suggests that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order 
GlaxoSmithKline to withhold the assessment from the clients’ share of the settlement 
proceeds. However, Girardi Keese promised to contribute the entire assessment, and the 
District Court could ensure that it complied with the agreement and Pretrial Order 70. 
Whether it must reimburse its clients for that share of the assessment is a question 
governed by the representation agreement between Girardi Keese and its clients. 
6 We do not and need not decide whether, in the absence of Pretrial Order 70, the 
District Court could exercise jurisdiction over Girardi Keese’s agreement with the 
Steering Committee—a court-appointed and court-supervised entity. 
 15 
the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” In 
re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although Girardi Keese says it spent fourteen million dollars litigating its cases, it 
did not offer evidence that its efforts were for the common benefit as opposed to solely 
on behalf of its clients. We cannot say the District Court abused its discretion in failing to 
consider or grant a credit for the common benefit Girardi Keese provided when no 
evidence exists in the record that Girardi Keese actually provided a common benefit. 
This is not to say, however, that Girardi Keese is not entitled to an award from the 
common benefit fund. If Girardi Keese makes the “proper showing” to the District Court 
required by Pretrial Order 70, then as “[a]ttorneys who have signed the Participation 
Agreement” the firm would be entitled to an award from the common benefit fund. App. 
at 188. If Girardi Keese believes it has provided a common benefit to all plaintiffs 
litigating over Avandia, it may and should apply to the District Court for such an award. 
IV. 
For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
